|  | Below is a draft excerpt 
        from
 The Politics of Universal Compassion
 by Joel Federman
 
 One 
        of the most pernicious presuppositions about the human potential--one 
        so widely held it is very rarely debated--is the assumption that violence 
        is an inevitable part of social life. As long as people believe in the 
        inevitability of violence, they will never have faith that compassion 
        can become the predominant ethos of social and political life. However, 
        there is strong evidence to suggest that the prevalence of violence can 
        be--if not decreased to zero--drastically reduced. 
 During the last several decades, there has been increased scientific attention 
        given to the causes of violence and how they might be prevented. Research 
        on the causes of violence, as reviewed by the American Psychological Association 
        (Eron, 1994: passim) and the National Academy of Science (Reiss and Roth, 
        1993: passim), shows that violence is in large part a learned behavior, 
        and is, in roughly equal measure, preventable. Though anger, frustration, 
        and conflict are universal aspects of human experience, and aggressive 
        impulses are in part biologically determined, by addressing the social 
        contributors to violence, its occurrence can be dramatically reduced. 
        Violence has begun to be understood by scientists, public policymakers, 
        and the medical community as a public health phenomenon, with increasing 
        attention being given to addressing the "risk factors" that contribute 
        to its occurrence, and the way that such risk factors interact with each 
        other to increase or decrease the resulting likelihood of aggressive behavior. 
        (Reiss and Roth, 1993: 33-34)
 
 To be sure, identifying those factors that increase or decrease the likelihood 
        of violence is not a simple, one-dimensional, task. The contributors to 
        violent attitudes and behaviors are myriad, and include socioeconomic 
        pressures, exposure to glamorized and trivialized media violence, antisocial 
        family and peer influences, and the easy availability of guns. Nonetheless, 
        there is evidence that demonstrates the possibility of dramatically reducing 
        the rate of violent behavior.
 
 Consider, for example, that rates of homicide differ dramatically from 
        state to state, and more dramatically from country to country. According 
        to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, an average of 2.6 out 
        of every 100,000 Americans under the age of 15 die violently each year, 
        compared to an average of 0.51 per 100,000 in 25 other industrialized 
        countries included in their survey; that's five times the violent death 
        rate. U.S. child-aged deaths caused by firearms average 1.66 out of every 
        100,000 children; in other countries the rate is 0.14 per 100,000. These 
        astonishing statistics do not mean that Americans are more violent by 
        nature than people in other countries. To the contrary, they tell us that 
        the social cues and habits that disinhibit and encourage violence differ 
        from place to place. In turn, it can be concluded that by changing the 
        factors that contribute to violent attitudes and behaviors, it is possible 
        to reduce the level of violence in a society. Since there exist and have 
        existed cultures which are much more peaceful than our own (most other 
        industrialized nations), it is therefore possible to reform our culture 
        to make it less violent, and potentially to reform global culture along 
        the same lines. The short form of this argument, offered by Kenneth Boulding, 
        is: "Anything that exists is possible."
 
 A second set of evidence for the possibility of reducing violence exists 
        in studies of educational efforts to affect aggressive behaviors and attitudes. 
        For example, Grossman and colleagues found that elementary school children 
        in Washington state exposed to lessons in anger management, impulse control 
        and empathy training engaged in less physically aggressive behavior and 
        more prosocial behavior in school. (Grossman, 1997: 1605) Another study 
        found that students exposed to a long-term program aimed at reducing risky 
        behaviors were 19 percent less likely to have committed violent acts by 
        age 18 than their peers who did not receive the program. (Brody, 1999: 
        16)
 International 
        Violence
 In the spheres of inter-ethnic and international politics, the question 
        of the inevitability of violence is, of course, more complex. But, a parallel 
        argument to the one stated above regarding intra-national violence rates 
        can be made, namely that proof of the possibility of global peace can 
        be found in the successful establishment of peaceful inter-ethnic and 
        international relations of smaller scale.
 
 More specifically, it can be found in instances of international relations 
        which have the character of what Kenneth Boulding called "stable peace." 
        Boulding defined stable peace as "a situation in which the probability 
        of war is so small that it does not really enter into the calculations 
        of any of the people involved." (Boulding, 1978: 13) An example of stable 
        peace in the international sphere might be the current relations between 
        the United States, Canada, Japan, or Britain. If one examines history, 
        one finds that the areas that today enjoy stable peace did not always 
        do so. Boulding notes, for example, that Sweden and Denmark fought each 
        other for hundreds of years before gradually evolving a state of stable 
        peace beginning around 1815. (Boulding, 1985: 124)
 
 Likewise, consider the relations between the United States and Canada, 
        understood as a near-ideal model for peaceful international relations. 
        If all international borders were maintained as the one between the United 
        States and Canada--completely demilitarized, with passport-free access 
        to cross-border travel--most people would agree that world peace was close 
        to being achieved. But the stable peace between the United States and 
        Canada was not always a fact. As Boulding notes: (Stable peace between 
        the U.S. and Canada) certainly did not exist in 1812, when Britain and 
        the United States were at war on the Canadian boundary....In 1817 came 
        the Rush-Bagot Agreement, which disarmed the Great Lakes as a frontier 
        between the United States and Canada, at that time a British dependency.....There 
        was a dangerous episode in the early 1840s about the Canadian-American 
        frontier in the Northwest...as the British and the Canadians wanted what 
        they called 'Cascadia,' which is now Washington and Oregon....(It was 
        not until 1871 that) the Canadian boundary was finally settled and disarmed. 
        (Boulding, 1985: 124-5)
 
 The notion and practice of stable peace in limited areas of the world 
        provides a model that allows us to imagine the creation of similar inter-ethnic 
        and international relations on a global basis. Certainly, the creation 
        and continuing development of the European Union among countries that 
        in this century alone were the principal parties to two world wars can 
        be considered a stunning indicator of the potential for the creation of 
        stable peace among larger numbers of diverse nations and cultures. On 
        the principle that "anything that exists is possible," it should not be 
        that large a leap of logic to imagine extending stable peace to the planet 
        as a whole.
 
 All of the above is not meant to underestimate the enormous undertaking 
        that would be required to achieve something approximating world peace 
        or the relative elimination of violence. But, it should be recognized 
        that a world-wide effort of this sort is possible. Consider the example 
        of slavery, which, for most of history was considered to be "inevitable." 
        There was an extensive global slave trade, and many moral and religious 
        codes justified slavery--or simply assumed it to be a natural part of 
        social life. It was only in the late 1700s to early 1800s that the institution 
        of slavery was challenged by a significant social movement, with the establishment 
        in 1787 of the "Society for the Abolition of the African Slavetrade" in 
        London (Joyce, 1978: 14) and the creation in 1780 of a similar society 
        by the Society of Friends in New England (Cooney and Michalowski, 1977: 
        28) It took the abolition movement almost two hundred years to eventually 
        succeed in deligitimating slavery on a nearly global basis, as well as 
        abolishing the legal international slave trade. Though slavery can still 
        be found in pockets around the world, it is largely dead as a social institution. 
        Violence, as a largely-learned and socially constructed behavior, can 
        similarly be deligitimated, unlearned and de-institutionalized.
 As evidence 
        has shown, violence is a largely learned behavior and nonviolent attitudes 
        and behaviors can be learned and encouraged as well. In addition, areas 
        of stable peace currently exist within and between many cultures. World 
        peace, therefore, need not be created out of whole cloth. Instead, we 
        need "only" to expand the already-existing zones of peace to encompass 
        the planet as a whole. So, the issue is not whether it is possible to 
        move human social experience further and further in the direction of total 
        peace. While human conflict is inevitable, violent resolution of conflicts 
        is not. A relatively nonviolent world is possible.
 
 © 
        2002 Joel Federman   Back 
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